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Chimeras and Consciousness is a collection of essays
coming mainly from an international conference held
in 2004 in Bellagio, Italy, hosted by the Rockefeller
Foundation.
Lynn Margulis is the first of the three editors. She
hardly needs an introduction: in the late 1960s, she
pioneered and forcefully pushed the symbiogenetic the-
ory of the eukaryotic cell (Sagan 1967; Margulis 1970),
revolutionary at that time, but today confirmed by an
overwhelming mass of researches and data, renewed and
deepened at the molecular level in the genomic era
(Margulis & Sagan 2003)a. Eukaryotes have originated by
repeated symbiogenesis, the most famous of which is the
incorporation of former free-living bacteria (Lane &
Martin 2010). Details of the sequence and mechanisms
of the Serial Endosymbiosis Theory (SET) are still today
an exciting field of research (for example, Sassera et al.
2011). Margulis is unanimously seen as the scientist who
opened this new field of research. She is also known for
her tendency to radicalize and generalize her views
against the established ones, being a forerunner not only
for some specific theories but also for a way of looking
to the living world based on symbiosis and association
(cf. Gontier 2007, O’Malley 2010).
Second editor of Chimeras and Consciousness is
Celeste A. Asikainen, a young geologist, student in geo-
sciences at Lynn’s same institution: the University of* Correspondence: emanuele.serrelli@unimib.it
“Riccardo Massa” Department of Human Sciences, University of Milan
Bicocca, Piazza dell’Ateneo Nuovo 1, 20126 Milan, Italy
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reproduction in any medium, provided the origMassachussets, Amherst. Last editor is Wolfgang E.
Krumbein, geomicrobiologist at the Institut für Chemie
und Biologie des Meeres, Carl Von Ossietzky Univer-
sität, Oldenburg, Germany. We received the book to re-
view for Evolution: Education and Outreach in October
2011. One month later, on November 22, Lynn Margulis
died unexpectedly at 73. We hope that Asikainen and
Krumbein will not feel downplayed if we try to interpret
Chimeras and Consciousness mainly in the light of
Lynn’s lifetime work.
In the section ‘What’s in Chimeras and Conscious-
ness’ we summarize the content of the 23 essays
appearing in the book organized in five parts: ‘Selves’,
‘Groups’, ‘Earth’, ‘Chimeras’, and ‘Consciousness’. We
also make a few comments on such a structure, prob-
ing both the boundaries and internal coherence of
these topics. The main goal of the book seems a kind
of innovative unification of entities and processes like
consciousness, micro-organisms, evolution, and the
chemico-physical processes involving the Earth as a
whole. The editors and authors want to break up with
a tradition that, in their view, keeps all these topics
separated and marginalize some of them, thus hindering
understanding. Then we assess this unifiying endeavor,
analyzing it in terms of an all-encompassing glance, of the
discovery of sameness, and/or of an explanatory history
or theory. The conclusion summarizes and makes an over-
all evaluation of the book as more an inspirational than a
scientific work, related to some ancient philosophical
themes.What’s in Chimeras and Consciousness
The longest parts in the book are on chimeras (seven
essays) and consciousness (five essays). The shortest is
the one about Earth (three essays). In what follows weer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly cited.
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reasons: first we want to appreciate the remarkable
interdisciplinarity of the group; second we want to assess
a claim made by Lynn Margulis in the Preface, charac-
terizing the authors as ‘real scientists’ as opposed to
intermediaries or journalists (see ‘Unification as a puta-
tive causal story’ below).
The first part, ‘Selves’, is about micro-organisms seen
as the most basic example of what a self is. Actually, the
first essay by medical researcher Frank P. Ryan (Ch.1) is
about viruses and claims that they are not selves, and
the second by chemist William Day (Ch.2) is about the
origin of life, that is on the transition between living and
non-living. So we may say that the first half of the sec-
tion is devoted to probe the fuzzy boundaries of the cat-
egory of ‘self ’, where viruses are an important although
non-autonomous element:
. . .the “selves” of viruses, utterly depend on their
physical contact with bacterial or other living cells. If
not connected to a cell, a virus is as inert as a lump of
salt or a cube of sugar. The basic element of life, the
self, is the sensitive bacterial cell; but a virus, as a
courier and an integrator of genes into bacteria and
nucleated organisms (animals, plants, fungi and
proctotists), can be very important to specific
evolutionary trajectories (p. 17).
The second half of Part I presents bacteria as ‘social’
selves, ever forming communities: chemical signals like
alarmones addressed by biologists Antonio Lazcano,
Arturo Becerra, and Luis Delaye (Ch.3), analogous to
plant and animal hormones, connect and shape such
communities, and these in turn alter dramatically their
abiotic environment as geobiologist Kenneth H. Nealson
describes (Ch.4). A message here is that there is nothing
between ‘non-living’ and ‘selves-in-community’. In other
words, the editors and perhaps the authors of this book
are against the idea of a self in isolation. Sticking to a
strict logic of the book, however, it is not clear whether
Lazcano et al. and Nealson would have been likewise ap-
propriate in the subsequent part of the book: are the
'communities' described here different from the 'groups'
referred to later?
The second part deals with ‘Groups’, identified as
‘life’s components’ by the editors (p. 5) in opposition to
individuals. The chapter by physicist Eshel Ben-Jacob,
science manager Yoash Shapira, and philosopher of
medicine Alfred I. Tauber (Ch.5) describes bacteria as
capable of communication and even social intelligence.
The next essay by two of the editors, geomicrobiologist
Krumbein and geologist Asikainen (Ch.6), tells how
bacteria build large-scale constructions altering the
landscape and their own environment. The next essay,by psychotherapist Laurie Lassiter (Ch.7), strives to ex-
tend psychodynamic models to micro-organisms, on
seriously questionable epistemological bases as we shall
see in ‘Unification as statement of sameness’. It is from
this essay that we drew St. Francisb into our title. Geosci-
entist and science communicator James MacAllister
comes nextc, with a largely theoretical discussion empha-
sizing the evolutionary significance of groups which are
chimeric, from so-called individuals to symbiotic assem-
blies up to Gaia, that is, ‘the physiological system at the
surface of our planet’ (p. 6).
Part III, ‘Earth’, addresses the resonances between life
and its physical, cosmic macroenvironment. It begins
with an essay by astronomist and ‘rational astrologist’
Bruce Scofieldd focusing on cyclic, regular rhythms: cir-
cadian rhythms realized in biochemical processes and
widespread in all life’s reigns, photoperiodisms, tidal and
lunar rhythms, magnetotaxis, solar cycles. Paul Lowman
(geologist) and Nathan Currier (music composer)e ad-
dress ‘how has Earth kept its oceans’ (p. 126), showing
the crucial importance of life in global water homeore-
sis. No oceans without life, no plate tectonics without
oceans, no biological evolution without tectonics: the
loop is closed. Ecologist Peter Warshall, in one of the
longest and best documented essays of the whole book,
narrates what he calls the ‘photo-biological evolutionary
history of the planet’ (p. 130), that is ‘the story of the
planet’s photo-environments together with life’s pho-
tosensory systems’ (p. 129). Warshall argues for a theory
of cognition (including, recently, the human mind) based
on light and color discrimination, rooting such phenom-
ena in his photo-biological story. He maintains that such
a story ‘explains how life can receive, evaluate and act
on only certain wavelengths and frequencies of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum’ (p. 129), and contributes to
accounting for the human mind. In a nutshell: no mind
without light.
Part IV, ‘Chimeras’, groups seven essays. The reason for
some choices in such a grouping is not immediately ap-
parent. It is evident that this book pushes ‘chimeras’ - ‘a
mythical beast that blends the parts of real animals’ and
‘something that represents the successful merger of two
or more distinct beings’ (p. 4) - as a fundamental phe-
nomenon in life and evolution, but what is to be inten-
ded with the term?
One possible meaning is found in the expression ‘out-
side becomes inside’, in the essay by geoscientist John L.
Hall and Lynn Margulisf: chimera is a compenetration of
bodies. In the history of life, it happened many times
when ‘. . .organisms of different kinds lived together until
they periodically or permanently merged and covered
themselves with exudates, skins, sheaths, or coats made
by both partners’ (p. 162). In particular they address the
case of spirochetes, that is, helically-shaped bacteria now
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found in free-living form as well). In eukaryotes, former
spirochetes are co-opted as intracellular structures, mo-
tility organs, and sensory cilia. ‘The scientific literature -
they write - abounds with evidence that sensory systems
of humans and all other mammals (mechanoreception;
photoreception; smell and taste) evolved by redeploy-
ment of undulipodia’ (p. 163). The transition from out-
side to inside is crucial in the essay by medical
microbiologist and immunologist McFall-Ngai about the
immune systemg: she proposes that the simple idea of
the immune system as a ‘non-self ’ recognition system
should be overcome. Vertebrates and invertebrates, in-
deed, seem to have different evolved strategies in their
interaction with the microbial world:
Invertebrates limit their interaction with microbes to
only a few species; i.e., their approach is ‘restrictive’:
to rid themselves of all dare enter. By contrast, an
individual vertebrate associates with several microbial
communities, each composed of hundreds of distinct
individually recognized microbial groups (phylotypes).
The vertebrate approach is permissive (p. 205).
Interestingly, McFall-Ngai derives some testable hy-
potheses about the immune systems of different taxa,
and counters the idea of vertebrates as immunologically
more advanced. The widespread introduction and estab-
lishment of communities into an organism is to be taken
into account, according to paleoecologist Jessica Hope
Whiteside and science writer Dorion Sagan, also in
medicineh: ‘A theoretical emerging practice of medical
symbiotics [perhaps opposed to antibiotics!—ed.] would
explicitly recognize that health must be seen in the con-
text of microecology (the cell communities in the body)
and evolutionary change’ (p. 215). Debates about ‘chime-
rization’ in medical bioethics would perhaps be different
in the mind of these authors who look at the deep chi-
merical nature of any organism, so that even ‘eating is a
prelude to endosymbiosis’ (p. 217).
‘Outside becoming inside’ is thus a first, processual,
transitional meaning of ‘chimera’ found in the book. But
in several passages of the ‘Chimeras’ section, another
related, more (homeo)static category takes center stage:
that of part-whole existence. The processual aspect of
something entering into something else is downplayed,
for example, when Whiteside & Sagan observe that ‘No
organism is impregnable; each functions always as part
of a community of superorganisms whose behavior, phy-
siology, and even genetics are in flux’ (p. 216). Medical
researcher Andrew Maniotisi describes some universally
shared basic aspects of DNA packaging, dating back
3,000 million years ago, questioning the idea that chro-
mosomes are separated and independent one from theother. Maniotis’s experiments reveal chromosomal dis-
continuity as an artifact of past experiments: chromoso-
mes are linked by threads of DNA (chromolinkers), a
characteristic they share with the ancestral, circular ‘ge-
nophore’, though being augmented and restructured in
comparison to it. Another author dealing with chromo-
somes is geneticist Robin Kolnickij. She describes chro-
mosome splitting as a mode of speciation that, she
argues, occurs in sympatric populations. Evidence of
repeated chromosomal splits is found in mammalian
evolutionary courses towards specialization. Kolnicki al-
so tries to relate this phenomenon (causing hybrid steri-
lity by genetic incompatibility) with a phenotypic trait
which is also important in the evolution of primates:
variation of olfactory receptors. For Kolnicki, ‘Although
there is no evidence that karyotypic fission directly cau-
ses genetic and protein changes in primate olfaction,
this idea deserves further investigation’ (p. 181). For ex-
ample, Kolnicki speculates, chromosome fission might
increase mutation rate in some newly-telomeric regions,
so that ‘a male’s fissioned chromosomes might be sensed’
(p. 180). The more general problem Kolnicki seems to
be touching is how various kinds of change co-occur
and interact in living organisms, whose nature is that of
multi-scale aggregates of different entities. Forcing the
interpretation a little bit to make some sense of unity of
the ‘Chimeras’ part, all these essays deal with the hier-
archical structure of the living, below and above the level
of the ‘individual’. Inverted commas are due: paradoxic-
ally, it seems that the recognition of life’s radically
chimeric nature forces these authors to question the
very idea of ‘one individual’, ending up by ontologically
dissolving chimeras too. No individuals, indeed, implies
no chimeras (that is, combined individuals). In its sec-
ond meaning chimeras is thus an instrumental, disposable
critical concept aimed at questioning the notion of neatly
defined, isolated living entities. The authors seem to share
part-whole descriptions tinged with a ‘cosmic’ community
view pervaded by ‘the priority of interactions and
interrelationships’ (p. 1): for Whiteside and Sagan, for ex-
ample, ‘Clearly a new science, “medical symbiotics”, might
be organized, planned, and funded that would study health
from a cosmic and microecological standpoint. The first
task would be to jettison the idealistic nonsense of
the organism as an isolated, genetically impregnable
system, a culture of one’ (p. 218).
Another meaning of chimeras is more markedly geno-
typic: chimeras are organisms whose DNA includes se-
quences from different lineages. Viruses, as already seen
in essay 1, are one of the vectors of Lateral Gene Trans-
fers. Sonya E. Vickers and Donald I. Williamsonk present
the striking case of invertebrate species sharing identical
larval stages, their adult forms being as diverse as a
moth and an ant, or a worm and a clam. Excluding both
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relying on evidence for recent achievement of a larval
stage in many lineages, they follow the larval-transfer
hypothesisl, proposing that ‘an adult animal and its
larvae are a chimera that evolved from the fusion of at
least two very different animals’ (p 185). Vickers and
Williamson call for a familiarity with punctuated equilib-
ria theory (Eldredge & Gould 1972), but they do not re-
mark that their own inference on evolution is stronger,
implying saltation within one generation:
Fertile sex - egg-sperm fertilization - occurred (and
still does) between members of entirely different
species, even different phyla. The rare but fertile
hybrids generated striking new animal life forms in a
geological instant. [. . .] Some hybrids, in fact, left
many viable descendants that survived as doubled and
even tripled or even quadrupled genomes. How did
two or more disparate animal beings in the same body
at the same time ensure the indefinite continued
survival of the hybrids? By expression of the
combined genome in sequence rather than
concurrently. The larval genome is envisioned to
express itself first in the sequence; then the second,
third, or fourth genome would express the adult
morphology. Metamorphosis from larva to adult is a
legacy of the shift from one to another of unlike
ancestors (pp. 183–4).
A further meaning of chimera seems to be proposed
in part V by neuroscientist John Skoylesm. He argues
that the human brain is ‘chimerized’ in that symbols
‘blend’ with its neural apparatus, modifying its
functioning. This is possible because evolution left areas
of the cortex open to training and retraining, thus
allowing for ontogenic neural plasticity. Skolyles’s favor-
ite examples concern experiments showing that the
auditory cortex receiving light in early development can
visually recognize objects, and, vice versa, the visual cor-
tex can develop and become auditory. ‘Spare cerebral
cortex’ is also necessary to plasticity: ‘the symbol
processing [. . .] requires a large brain so newly
developed functions will not crowd out old ones’ (p.
236). Symbols, for Skoyles, chimerize neural circuits ‘by
providing them with novel inputs and outputs’ (p. 239).
Notice that chimerization, in this case, is something
being reliably repeated in each generation, individual by
individual, during development and learning. Language,
for example, ‘depends on ancestors [. . .]. Already-
existing input is essential. Language doesn’t emerge de
novo in each person; it is passed, with little modification,
from generation to generation. We speak the language
of our parents, they spoke the language of their parents,
and so on, further and further back in the past’ (p. 236).The evolutionary hypothesis in this view is that, before the
invention of symbols in human evolution, brains ‘were
raw perceptions, motor control, and emotions that were
just sufficiently developed to enable continued animal sur-
vival. But now chimerized, they generate a rich diversity of
attributes that had not existed previously’ (p. 238).
Part V is dedicated to Consciousness. Skoyles’s pro-
posal of the brain-symbols chimera (seen above) might
seem at odds with other notions involving the combin-
ation of living beings (symbols are not), or, at least, ma-
terial transfer. Science writer Dorion Sagann can be seen
as casting a bridge here, by showing that cultural objects
involve energy-matter transfer as well. He questions the
traditional ‘mind-matter’ divide exploring its philoso-
phical roots, and arguing that ‘consciousness, far from
belonging to a radically distinct “spiritual” realm, is an
outgrowth of the naturally complex behavior of self-
maintaining thermodynamic systems’ (p. 250). Primat-
ologist Judith Masterso describes how jungle primates
(great galagos) maintain social bonds before and beyond
copulation and mating, through complex signals that
encode for both species and individual identity. In the
closing essay, Luis Ricop, artist and culture activist, de-
nounces the fragmentation of knowledge affecting sci-
ence and art. He admires ‘holistic thinkers’ (p. 261)
comparing, for example, Gaia theory to Dadaism and
Futurism (p. 263) in that they seek a message of hope
for our future. We are a ‘thinking layer’ on planet Earth,
and ‘In spite of our limited, ancient sensory system, our
anthropocentrism, prejudical symbolism, biased educa-
tions, dangerous ignorance, and distracting technologies,
our imaginations tend to soar’ (p. 266).
Two appendices and a glossary complement the book.
Appendix A lists the major groups of living organisms
(from Margulis & Chapman 2010), and Appendix B
shows the International Geological Scale. The 23-page
glossary, ranging from ‘abiotic’ to ‘Xanthophyte’, is very
complete.
An assessment of unificationist achievements of
Chimeras and Consciousness
At the beginning of this review we identified innovative
unification as a main goal of Chimeras and Conscious-
ness. According to Margulis’s Preface, science is a spe-
cialistic detailed exploration that tends to lose the big
picture, despite the fact that nature disregards boun-
daries among disciplines. Fields must be merged and
integratedq, although we have to be suspicious of ‘jour-
nalistic complete explanations and comprehensive stories’
(p. xiv). Did the editors, by assembling the 23 hetero-
geneous essays, succeed in realizing, or at least in paving
the way for, a scientific unification of glaringly distant
terms like evolution, selves, groups, the Earth, chimeras,
and consciousness? The answer varies according to the
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succeed in bringing together those phenomena in a grand
picture, a fresco with significant changes of focus with re-
spect to usual ways to pose the problems. But, if by unifi-
cation we mean a grand empirical hypothesis, a ‘unified
account of a range of different phenomena [that] may ex-
hibit connections or relationships between phenomena
previously thought to be unrelated’ (Woodward 2009),
Chimeras and Consciousness seems to be ashore. Abstrac-
tion from phenomena like symbiogenesis or communica-
tion among bacteria leads to unifications that risk to be
only terminological, and to overlook important distinc-
tions, for example, purpose vs. equilibrium, or ecological
vs. genealogical assemblies. For what concerns correla-
tions and descent among, for example, conciousness, self,
evolution, and cosmic processes, the book leaves us with
scarce general hypotheses. Least of all it answers ‘the
greatest mystery’, that is, the origin and evolution of life’s
consciousness from the simple behaviors and interrela-
tionships of connected living entities (Margulis on p. xiv).
Unification as looking together
First, consider unification as a kind of ‘looking together’
things that are usually viewed separately and of shifting
scientific attention towards less explored territories.
Lynn Margulis has been described as ‘the microcosm
champion’ (Bandi & Casiraghi 2011). She thought that
evolutionary biologists had been shortsighted in nar-
rowing down evolution to metazoans, that is, to the last
500 millions of years over more than 3.5 billion (the
time passed since the origin of life). Microbes dominate
at all scales, their scientific study does not. For example,
‘Ten percent or more of our body weight - Margulis said
- is bacterial, and it’s just foolish to ignore that’ (in Mann
1991, p. 378). In about a half of Chimeras and Con-
sciousness (for example, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 13, 18) bacteria and
other micro-organisms have a leading role. In his essay,
James MacAllister writes:
The zoological view that dominates the literature on
evolution is short-sighted. S.J. Gould once
characterized the Precambrian as a time in which
“nothing happened for ever so long”. “On the
contrary” the evolutionist Lynn Margulis replied “the
Precambrian is when everything important in the
evolution of life is happened” (p. 103).
Today the scientific milieu is friendly to this approach,
and the idea that microbes are ‘the dominant life form
on the planet, both now and throughout evolutionary
history’ (O’Malley & Dupré 2007, p. 155) is more widely
accepted. Furthermore, a growing literature argues that
microbes, differing from macrobes by a number of cru-
cial aspects, have the potentiality of revolutionizing thescientific view of evolution, for example undermining
the classic idea of the tree of life (O’Malley 2010). By the
way, the apology of microbes is both contradicted and
reaffirmed by the cover illustration of Chimeras and
Consciousness, dominated by the photograph of a fluffy
lemur, with the humble and marginal superimposition of
a few, small, drawn proctists and microscopic images.
The cover contradicts the book’s spirit, but at the same
time reveals the ‘mammalian attraction’ of potential
readers, reaffirming the still current necessity of fighting
for microbes. Margulis’s lifetime effort could be des-
cribed as a double, ‘zooming out-zooming in’ movement:
it is the consideration of the ‘3-billion-year dance be-
tween life and the environment’ (Eldredge in Mann
1991, p. 381) that brings into clear focus the pre-emi-
nence of micro-organisms. The same movement can be
perceived in Chimeras and Consciousness, especially in
Part III: in reading the essays therein, one gets a picture
of the large-scale, cosmic, dynamic physico-chemical
systems that encapsulate life on Earth. From this stand-
point, micro-organisms take a massive part in huge
waves of lightr, matters, and energy, whereas metazoans
(all the most vertebrates, mammals, primates, and us)
look like feeble and evanescent foam. Laying down a
phenomenon like ‘consciousness’ in such a context ge-
nerates a perspective which seems interesting and un-
usual: a top-down view, in which consciousness is seen
as a stroke in the big picture of life, a product of the
conditions allowing us to be here. This top-down view
may have specific implications for research, like when
the editors suggest that ‘the most elemental of all senses
might be life’s sensitivity to the quantity and the saltiness
of water’ (pp. 10–13).
Unification as statement of sameness
In Chimeras and Consciousness a self is an autopoie-
tic unit. Grossly, a unicellular organism is the minimal
self (although the origin of life is ‘more like a waterfall’,
essay 2). Yet the book plays on the ambiguity between
this relatively undemanding definition of self and the
psychological meaning of self, concerned with emotion,
cognition, sociality, and representation (for example,
Sedikides & Brewer 2010). Common sense too, after all,
relates ‘self ’ to our emotional and rational consciousness
and awareness. In the foreword, theologian John Cobbs
seems to reveal this unresolved ambiguity when he
writes that ‘we can study the evolution of what in this
book are called “selves” as well as the evolution of
bodies’ (p. x, our emphasis). Would psychologists be
satisfied by the redefinition of ‘self ’ - their own object of
study (for example, Gallagher 2011) - operated in the
book? Conversely, isn’t there the risk of projecting
and superimposing psychic phenomena on the impertin-
ent domain of unicellular life? Psychotherapist Laurie
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psychodynamic theory of the ‘differentiation of the self ’
(DoS) applies, as it is, ‘to microbes, including myxo-
bacteria and heterocystous (nitrogen-fixing) cyanobac-
teria’ (p. 72). In this view, Lassiter performs a series of
identifications, for example, the reproductive cells in
the filament of heterocysts would be the ‘emotional sys-
tem’ of heterocysts (p. 88). More generally, for Lassiter
‘Bowen’s main idea - that developmental processes in
the family emotional system determine individuals’ life
course trends - [. . .] is conducive to detailed analysis of
individual and group behavior for accurate description
of the social lives of not only the human family but also
the many other gregarious forms of life’ (p. 90). Lassiter’s
essay seems largely off-line with respect to the biological
tone of the preceding essays, so much so indeed to
sound grotesque. In our view, while there can be some
common pattern in triadic and, more generally, inter-
active systems, it is far too much to say that the same
theory applies to Saint Francis and cyanobacteriat.
Chimeras and Consciousness features a series of scat-
tered and parallel terminological choices: statements of
sameness. But their unification effect is debatable. The
idea of collectively-intelligent bacteria (essay 5), for ex-
ample, could knock us off our chairsu, but it has to be
contextualized in the rethoric strategy of this book, ba-
sed on an often implicit redefinition of terms. This re-
definition in fact cannot satisfy someone who is looking
for ‘what’s peculiar about animal or human intelligence’:
if we normalize intelligence, we lose our explanandum.
Even the crucial term ‘chimeras’ (part IV) is, in our view,
a terminological aggregation of seemingly heterogeneous
entities and processes. As we have already analyzed, dif-
ferent cases of compenetration of bodies, part-whole
existence, connectedness, genetic hybridization, and
fusional blending don’t seem to share a common pattern
or mechanism beyond a very general, intuitive idea. So
probably what is going on with these terminological
unifications is an abstraction from the process of sym-
biogenesis - a corroborated empirical hypothesis - and a
use of it, through the terminological shift to ‘chimeras’,
as a metaphor of many other dynamics in the history of
life. Indeed, one thing is to claim that ‘evolution by sym-
biosis or “symbiogenesis” could explain many specific
phenomena’ (Schaechter 2012), another thing is to argue
that symbiosis explains the great majority of biological
evolution (marginalizing natural selection), a further
claim is that evolution wholesale happens by chimeriza-
tion. And chimeras as a metaphor become a more and
more general view, an epistemological filter that privi-
leges and detects certain features. Such strategy seems,
eventually, to mirror the polemic target of the book, that
is, neo-Darwinism. Or better, as we read in the foreword
by theologian John B. Cobbs, the transfiguration of neo-Darwinism into a philosophical position, an ideology,
namely the commitment to a reductionist, determinist,
geno-centric metaphysics (p. ix), and the reductio ad
absurdum of living things as ‘zombies’, machines mani-
pulated by genes seen as ‘forces’ (p. x). Cobbs also says
that the ‘zombies account’ has done harm ‘partly by evo-
king equally unacceptable reactions’ (p. xi). Is Chimeras
and Consciousness a scientifically acceptable reaction?
Our worry is that the transfiguration of symbiogenesis
into a philosophical position hardly brings a surplus of
scientific knowledge, while it runs the risk of overloo-
king some crucial achievements of evolutionary biology,
like the reformulation of teleological claims, and the dis-
tinction between ecological and genealogical domains, as
we explain hereafter.
The ‘chimerizing’ general view of evolution seems to
bring along an inference that reintroduces purpose in
evolution. The first premise of the inference is, as Cobb’s
foreword emphasizes, that the activity of living things is
causally relevant and explanatory of what happens; in
opposition, genetic mutations often follow on changed
behavior: ‘the accumulation of random mutations in
genes - the editors write in the introduction - is neither
the only source of evolutionary novelty nor the major
sources’ (p. 3). The second premise is that animal activ-
ity is mostly purposeful. The deduction would be that
we are allowed to talk about evolution in genuinely final-
istic terms, as suggested by expressions like ‘life changes
the environment to fit itself ’ (p. 13), or ‘endosymbiosis
[which precedes both plants and animals] altered Earth
by providing plants for animals to eat and additional
oxygen for them to breathe’ (Lake 2012). The evident
error of reasoning here is that goal-directedness is very
hardly preserved in spatio-temporal scale transitions.
Darwin’s theory of natural selection expunged purpose
from the history of life by the principle of blind variation
and selective retention. Blind variation does not mean
that individual organisms are blind or dumb: it might
well be the contrary. But variation is blind to its cumu-
lative, large-scale effects. This crucial passage in evolu-
tionary theory, which has to do with scale shifting, is
perhaps difficult to grasp and hold. From time to time,
theoretical innovations are misinterpreted as if they
would reintroduce purpose in evolution. A recent case
shows some receptions of niche construction theory,
where the aggregate, long-term impact of population’s
characteristics on selective pressures has been conflated
with an individual organism’s purposeful modification of
its immediate environment (for example, Laland et al.
2009). At times, Chimeras and Consciousness seems to
lean towards similar, mistaken implications:
– having an evolved and regulated role in the
homeostasis of Gaia (granted that the latter is an
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having a community-oriented nature and action-
pattern, whereas there is no reason to rule out that
Gaia’s large scale equilibrium could be compatible
with various local-scale action and relationship
patterns, including non-cooperative and ‘selfish’ ones;
– being in an ancestral phylogenetic position, bacteria are
seen as a passage in a suggested tendency to change
and evolve more and more complex kinds of
awarenessv, whereas there is no such internal linear
tendency to complexity in evolution, and projection of
later outcomes on evolutionary precursors conveys an
appearance of predestination and determinism;
– similarly, looking at symbiotic associations as if they
only result from an internal élan neglects the fact
that they are here because they worked (and there is
no necessary ethical burden on this part of the
mechanism, which by the way has the virtue of
explaining cases where associations do not happen
or do not work so well).
So the reintroduction of purpose in evolution seems to re-
sult from amnesia about the laws of scale-shifting, known
and crucial in evolutionary theory. Another oversight
concerns the fact that ecological groups do not coincide
with evolutionary groups, and more generally the economic
and the genealogical domains are distinct although related
in the living world (Eldredge 2008). Chimeras and Con-
sciousness insists that individual survival is not the only dy-
namics: collectivities and associations act in evolution (p. 3).
Neo-Darwinists tend to ignore any ecological concept
of community and deny the idea that communities
can be identified as units that evolve (MacAllister,
p. 98).
But the book is never explicit about the fact that
action in evolution has to do with - and only with - pro-
ducing lineages. Collectivities and associations are eco-
logical assemblies that act in the ecological-economic
world, in a sensory and physiological context. They act
also in evolution if and to the extent that they impact
the configuration of lineages in the genealogical space.
Consider the following passage:
As the word “chimera” suggests, all organisms visible
to the unaided eye are integrated former symbionts.
Evolving from ancestral units, organisms of different
kinds lived together until they periodically or
permanently merged and covered themselves with
exudates, skins, sheaths, or coats made by both
partners. Over evolutionary time, the outside became
the inside at a higher, more inclusive level of living
organization (p. 162).This account visualizes these organisms of different
kinds in the ecological world doing all these actions dur-
ing their life, and the dimension of ‘evolutionary time’
seems to just provide a long, long duration for the ef-
fects of these actions to become deep and stablew. But
being more aware and analytical, we should make expli-
cit that ‘over evolutionary time’ means shifting from
organisms to lineages of organisms, and from environ-
ment as a direct agent to environment as a selective
agent (on inherited information): so it is inaccurate to
say that ‘multicellular organisms are integrated former
symbionts’, rather, back in deep time, the lineage of any
multicellular organism gradually splits, traversing a pe-
riod when the ancestral lineages were merging because
somewhere in the ecological world the organisms were
living together in close association. Framing things in
this way would pretty much soften many polemic claims
sounding like ‘for neo-Darwinism groups have no role in
evolution’. The point is that perhaps ecological aggrega-
tions always have effects on genealogy, but such effects
are not straightforward. On the other hand, species are
certainly the topical example of genealogical unit (closed
inbreeding, according to the biological species concept)
but they do not play an ecological role: parts of the spe-
cies - local populations - do. Niles Eldredge has repeat-
edly and successfully pointed out that ecology and
genealogy should not be conflated in evolution. None-
theless they usually are, and Chimeras and Conscious-
ness does not seem immune to this. Hall and Margulis
write, ‘The word “symbiosis” refers to an ecological con-
dition: the presence of one type of organism becomes
the persistent environment of the other’ (p. 161, our em-
phasis). But they omit that this association becomes evo-
lutionarily relevant when there is a merging of lineages
(that is, a genealogical condition). And consider this
quotation:
Life does indeed change its environment to fit itself
[. . .] does the assertion that “any organism” is “well
adapted to its environment” have any meaning? All
organisms alive today are “adapted” by virtue of the
fact that they live. Their ancestors have survived from
the past to the present. Gaia emerges as different
organisms affect one another and their surroundings
(p. 13).
Organisms do indeed alter the environment and affect
others in a way that favors their continuing existence,
but in fact, while they do so, at the very same time, they
do have a differential probability of surviving and repro-
ducing. As Ghiselin (1966) clarified very well, differential
reproductive success (fitness) is a statistical measure that
nonetheless, through heritability, affects the long term
change of populations.
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Finally, consider unification as the proposal of some
empirical hypothesis about relationships and descent be-
tween selves, symbiosis, consciousness, geochemical pro-
cesses, and so on. In the Introduction, the editors write:
‘Sensitivity, awareness and consciousness correlate with
living behaviour, which evolutionarily began with bac-
teria’ (p. 3, our emphasis). They furthermore claim that
cell awareness was here from the time of the origin of
earliest life, and that awareness and sensation continued
to evolve into full-blown consciousness as we humans
experience and verbalize it. Several essays suggest that
the phenomena they deal with are somehow necessary
precursors of consciousness or related issues: Warshall
in essay 11, for example, concludes by saying that ‘the
complex ancient photosensitive systems that produce
and respond to visible signals became an essential pre-
cursor to the human mind’ (p. 149). Are there, in Chi-
meras and Consciousness, hypotheses of how it could
happen? Only one essay addresses the issue directly, al-
though briefly: essay 19 by Gerhard Roth. Roth relies on
a theory of the states of consciousness, that would be
shared through the animal kingdom to different extent.
Simple awareness and attention are widely shared, self-
reflection allowed by complex language is uniquely
human, and in between we have empathy/anticipation
(found in primates and cetaceans) and knowledge attri-
bution, self-awareness and language (shared by humans
and great apes). Homo sapiens, ça va sans dire, wins all.
Moreover, consciousness is distinguished from higher
cognitive functions: only some of the latter require the
former. There is also a brain comparison among
tetrapods, motivated by the fact that, in humans, con-
sciousness seems exclusively associated with the cortex,
with some centers shared with animals. The evolutionary
hypothesis seems to be an adaptive one for what
concerns ‘the virtual actor, the ego’, where syntactical
language played a boosting role:
During the evolution of primates, increases in
demands of action planning, strategic thinking, and
complex syntactical language probably necessitated
the construction of a conscious phenomenal world
(p. 228).
Consciousness does not require syntactical
language. I posit that, since most people think and
plan verbally, the evolution of syntactical language
strongly favored higher states of consciousness
(p. 231, our emphasis).
Chimeras and Consciousness does collect many empi-
rical hypotheses and theories in specific domains, forexample, about working mechanisms of viruses (1), com-
munication among microbes (2), large-scale environ-
mental impacts of bacteria (6), resonances between
cosmic and organic rhytms at different levels (9), the co-
option of spirochetes as motor and sensory organs in
cells (13), the evolutionary sequence in the origin of im-
mune systems (17), the conserved structures of chro-
mosomes (14) and their relation with olfactory reception
(15, very speculative), neural plasticity (20), communica-
tion among primates (22), and morex. We have to men-
tion that at least two of the theories that are sold in
Chimeras and Consciousness do not enjoy much support
in the scientific community. This seems at odds with a
claim made by Margulis in the Preface, where she calls
for scientific authority, specifying that ‘unlike popular
science “trade books”, [this book] is highly concentrated
[. . .] It is “the real thing”: the chapters are written by real
scientists and other scholars without help [. . .] the usual
intermediaries invariably simplify; with the best of
intentions, they try to explain ideas that they do not
understand’ (p. xiii). We do not know exactly what ‘real
scientist’ is supposed to mean, but in fact there are many
science writers and ‘free thinkers’ among the authors of
Chimeras and Consciousness, and most working scien-
tists therein write about topics that are partly outside
their specialization. The larval-transfer hypothesis (16),
after a communication in PNAS (Williamson 2009) and
some harsh criticisms (Borrell 2009), was disproved
(Hart & Grosberg 2009)y; there is no trace of this debate
in the book, and that is not really what one would ex-
pect from ‘real scientists’ doing ‘the real thing’. The con-
troversial status of the Gaia hypothesis (Introduction, 8,
10, 23)z, first advanced by James Lovelock, is more
known. Margulis’s commitment to the Gaia hypothesis
raised harsh reactions in the scientific community since
mid 1970s, as told by Mann (1991): ‘many regard auto-
poietic Gaia as an unscientific attempt to deify the
biosphere’ (p. 252). Deeming the Gaia hypothesis as
unscientific is perhaps exaggerated, given that it could
anyway be elaborated so to produce testable predictions
(for example, Oduro et al. 2012). But again, the fact that
theories and hypotheses in the book are scarcely repre-
sentative of the scientific community and literature is
surprisingly omitted.
Deep philosophical roots
Should we reconstruct the deep historical genealogy of
the inspiration that underlies Chimeras and Conscious-
ness, also taking into consideration the foreword by
theologian John Cobb, we think we could call into play
terms like Hylozoism, Panpsychism, and above all we
should consider Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s thought.
Let’s start from the notion of Self, which has great im-
portance in the conceptual landscape of Chimeras and
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ity, the foremost feature of living beings, is not to be
seen only as reaction to the environment, but it is rather
to be understood as ability to carry out an active role in
determining what happens. All living beings are active
and would be defined selves. As we already pointed out
in ‘Unification as statement of sameness’, the term is not
precisely defined, and this leaves - with every probability
intentionally - different and even conflicting interpre-
tations open. The word ‘self ’ does not have a clear inten-
sion and therefore neither a clear extension. When one,
in a very dim way, assigns psychic or mental features
even to the simplest living forms, he can be defined as
Hylozoist or Panpsychist.
Hylozoism is a term that was coined around the mid-
dle of the 17th century by the English theologian and
philosopher Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688), one of the
most important members of the school of Cambridge.
This school hosted a group of thinkers who shared a
common, very syncretistic interest in Plato’s philosophy,
especially in the thought of philosophers who were mem-
bers of the Florence Academy (Marsilio Ficino and Pico
della Mirandola). Apart from this cultural background,
Cambridge philosophers were against Descartes’s me-
chanism, in particular against the extreme mathematical
strictness that was basically deterministic. In Descartes’s
philosophy, matter was understood as totally autonomous
from any spiritual agent and this point of view was almost
identical to atheism. The term Hylozoism (from Ancient
Greek ὕλη (hulē) = matter, and ζωή (zōē) = life) stands for
the idea that the principle of life is deeply rooted in matter,
and forms with this an indissoluble unity. Therefore, mat-
ter is no longer understood as an inert and passive prin-
ciple (cause) receiving action from outside, from a force of
different nature. Rather, matter is seen as a dynamic reality
in itself.
Panpsychism (from Ancient Greek παν (pan) = all,
and ψυχή (psyche) = soul) differs from Hylozoism, inso-
much as it comprises all those doctrines that ascribe to
matter an active principle, which is not biological, but
spiritual, analogous to the soul.
Hylozoistic positions have been recognized, although
controversially, in Thales, Anaximander who saw water as
life’s principle, giving life to all matter; and also in
Anaximander, who could have meant by ’απειρον (literally,
what is not delimited, having no boundaries) an undiffer-
entiated unity of dynamism and action, whence all beings
would spring (arise). Besides the Stoics, who saw nature as
moved by a vital breathing (πνεύμα), hylozoistic positions
were very frequent throughout Renaissance. Let’s have a
look at some of these: Telesio saw the Aristotelic form as
an immanent force, an active principle; Bruno imagined
matter enlived by a universal force, always creating and
diffused in the whole of creation.The position by the coiner of the term hylozoism,
Ralph Cudworth, is especially interesting. He meant to
fight atheism in its two different forms, the atomistic
mechanistic and the hylozoist. The first, originally put
forward by Democritus, admits only the local motion of
atoms. The second acknowledges life in nature, without,
however, ascribing to it a spiritual nature. Cudworth
maintains that the mechanistic view should be integrated
with the idea of a nature activated by a plastic or mold-
ing force that, according to him, molds matter from
within, thus acting as a mediator between the sensible
and the intelligible world. In Cudworth’s opinion, this
molding force is the spiritual tool, unaware of itself,
which God would use in order to introduce harmony
into the world, to avoid a too immediate interference,
consequently being irreproachable of causing evil
(Baldi 2006–2010, p. 2456).
In many cases, hylozoism and panpsychism are ba-
sically indistinguishable, if we mean by life a sort of
animation, as Bruno does. Such overlapping can cause
misinterpretations and deep misunderstandings. A philo-
sopher like Leibniz, too, upheld the idea that matter was
animated and that it could not be reduced only to atoms
provided exclusively with mechanical properties. By get-
ting this idea from Cudworth, Leibniz worked out his
theory of the monad. The concept of monad opposes
that of atom: if the latter is understood as an inanimate
particle, without drive, the former, on the contrary, is
conceived as an active principle, that underlies matter
and substance, because matter, above all organic matter,
is able to act. For Leibniz it was essential to conceive
matter on the basis of the notion of soul we have. The
monad is labeled in different ways by Leibniz: individual
substance, substantial form, real unit, constituent unit,
entelechy. It is, after all, a spiritual, active principle,
analogous to the soul, and therefore provided with per-
ception, appetition and volition.
The monad gives unity and identity to the body, and
appears to be comparable to the soul, that is, to what
human beings call the I or Self. As stated above, Leibniz
intends to counter monad with atom. Matter, according
to him, is not composed of atoms, but of monads, and
therefore it should be understood as an aggregate of
spiritual substances provided with a self (Boutroux 2001,
pp. 43–48). In his most famous work Leibniz writes:
there is a world of created things - living beings,
animals, entelechies, souls - in the smallest part of
matter.
Each portion of matter can be conceived as like a gar-
den full of plants, or like a pond full of fish. But each
branch of a plant, each organ of an animal, each drop of
its bodily fluids is also a similar garden or a similar
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plants in the garden, or the water separating the fish in
the pond, are neither plant nor fish, yet they still contain
them - though they are usually far too small for us to be
able to perceive them (Leibniz 1720, nn. 66-67-68).
These reflections most likely arose not only from
Leibniz’s conviction that matter is infinitely divisible,
but also, and above all, from the discoveries made by
Antonie van Leeuwenhoek (1632–1723). Between 1672
and 1677 the Dutch scientist discovered, thanks to his
observations with the microscope, the existence of Pro-
tista, bacteria, and spermatozoa, and so he opened the
way to microbiology. Leibniz understood that these dis-
coveries would later deeply change the idea of matter as
a motionless substrate: it was clear that individual
substances existed, that these were animated, provided
with a self, and that one could not reduce all to atoms.
Notably, hylozoism has been associated with the study
of microorganisms since very early in the history of
modern science!
To sum up, both the hylozoistic conceptions of matter
and Leibniz’s ideas about the nature of monad were a re-
action against a mechanistic image of the world that was
established in the middle of the 17th century, above all
through the works of Hobbes and Descartes. Mechanism
had expelled final causes from science, and consequently
threatened faith in God.
Looking again to Chimeras and Consciousness in light
of this sketchy history of ideas, the book gains a very
interesting light. By thinking over the notion of self, we
can see that deep analogies exist between such notion
and Leibniz’s idea of monad: it is a matter of centers,
unity, and activity. Above all, the polemical aim is
shared: if Leibniz and hylozoists like Cudworth entered
into a debate against reductionist and basically atheistic
mechanism, Lynn Margulis, together with James Love-
lock, entered into a debate against a certain kind of
gene-centered and reductionist view of Neo-Darwinism.
The foreword of the book by a theologian might imply
that the goal of the work is not merely scientific: the
symbiogenetic point of view together with the Gaia hy-
pothesis is not only scientific a stance waiting for empir-
ical demonstration. It is, above all, useful. How? Here is
what Lovelock wrote about the Gaia hypothesis:
The Gaia hypothesis is for those who like to walk or
simply stand and stare, to wonder about the Earth
and the life it bears, and to speculate about the
consequences of our own presence here. It is an
alternative to that pessimistic view which sees nature
as a primitive force to be subdued and conquered. It
is also an alternative to that equally depressing picture
of our planet as a demented spaceship, forever
travelling, driverless and purposeless, around aninner circle of the sun (Lovelock 1979, chp. 1,
our emphasis).
Gaia and symbiogenesis can tend, perhaps even un-
consciously, to reintroduce finalistic explanations. Kant
wrote in the Critic of Judgment that a finalistic reflection
on the whole universe is just a need of human mind,
never to become objective knowledge. Science does not
need to think in a finalistic way. We, as human beings,
perhaps do.Conclusion
Lynn Margulis was member of the US National Acad-
emy of Sciences and of the Russian Academy of Natural
Sciences, endowed with important awards like the US
President’s National Medal of Science and the Darwin-
Wallace Medal of the Linnean Society of London
(cf. Lake 2012). All colleagues who knew Lynn described
her as a bold and strong scientist whose ‘success did not
come easily. She had to stand up for her ideas and ac-
cept repeated rejections’ (Lake, cit.). Most accounts tell
that many scientists, after Lynn’s successful struggle for
the endosymbiotic theory, developed a fascinating cau-
tionary attitude towards her ideas. John Maynard Smith,
for example, said to Charles Mann:
I think she’s often wrong . . . But I must say, she was
crashingly right once, and many of us thought she
was wrong then, too (Ivi, p. 379).
How should the book she edited with Asikainen and
Krumbein, Chimeras and Consciousness, be welcomed?
An important point is that several kinds of ideas can be
found in Margulis’s record as well as in this book, and
each and every kind of idea can be right or wrong in a
peculiar way. Let us review the ideas of unification
proposed in the book.
In the case of ‘looking together the micro and the
macro’ (‘Unification as looking together’), it does not
seem appropriate to ask whether that is ‘right or wrong’.
A comprehensive, non-compartimentalized look at phys-
ics with biology, microbes with macrobes, humans with
all living species, genetics with ecological behavior, selec-
tion with symbiosis, planet with biosphere, and so on,
seems to be legitimate and helping against partiality and
towards an appreciation of relative importance. Margulis
was always ‘crashingly right’ in calling for attention on
microbes, whereas we all ‘generally perceive life to fall
into two broad categories, the microbes and macrobes,
and then pay most of their attention to the latter’
(O’Malley & Dupré cit.). Yet, it is important to say that
this perspective does not automatically explain away hu-
man or animal consciousness: in biology, species-specific,
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explanation.
As for empirical hypotheses (‘Unification as a putative
causal story’), by definition they can be true or false, like
the SET: as Schaechter (2012) reports, Margulis ‘cor-
rectly predicted that, if an organelle originated as a
free-living cell, it is possible that naturally occurring
counterparts still can be found among extant organisms’,
and that is exactly what happened. Empirical hypotheses
yield predictions: difficult and long as it might be to test
and decide about it, eukaryotic cells either have or
haven’t originated by symbiosis; more narrowly, this or
that particular genome either is or isn’t the result of
some hybridation among ancestors. Chimeras and Con-
sciousness reports many hypotheses of this kind. There
are two severe limits, however. First, very few of them
address the ‘really hard problem’ in the subtitle - that is,
how did the sensory self and consciousness evolve. Sec-
ond, despite the air of authority exhibited by this MIT
Press book, at least some of the particular hypotheses
here are controversial in the scientific community, and
this is not explicitly addressed nor declared.
The terminological unifications (for example, chime-
ras, self, intelligence) adopted in Chimeras and Con-
sciousness (‘Unification as statement of sameness’) seem
essentially vague and metaphorical. They play on ambi-
guities. The SET, the massive lateral gene transfer that
happened throughout evolution, and other theoretical
and empirical acquisitions undergo abstraction to a cer-
tain extent, and together they give a picture of life as
‘not shy’ (p. 4), forming associations more spontaneously
and more easily than previously thought (in the blatantly
deprecated, allegedly arid neo-Darwinian framework).
These abstractions and identifications might have heu-
ristic value, and build a perspective unveiling new con-
nections and phenomena. They are original ways of
organizing what we already know, more than new hy-
potheses about what we do not know. But they also
bring along confusion, particularly by overlooking dis-
tinctions like purpose vs. equilibrium, predestinate vs.
prerequisite, and ecological vs. genealogical, and they
draw an outdated, linear and progressionist picture of
evolution. Moreover, a well-known problem is that
works like this can be seen as supporting anti-naturalis-
tic views and apparent compatibilities with supernatural
explanatory factors. Often authors are not unaware of
these risks, and in reading Chimeras and Consciousness
too we have this sensation of a wink to theology.
But Lynn Margulis was an educator. Krumbein, as far
as we can infer from available information, is also a
raiser of young scholars. And Asikainen is herself one
of those young people, scientifically growing mature in
a transformed evolutionary theory. Margulis was a pa-
tient, bold, and uninhibited educator of minds for hercolleagues and the public, pushing them to accept
new and better ways of thinking appearing indigestible
and counterintuitive in the beginning. In non-public
contexts, she revealed that her support towards James
Lovelock was less the sharing of Gaia as a scientific
hypothesis, than it was a way of diffusing a metaphor
potentially increasing people’s responsiveness to environ-
mental problems and respect for life and Earth (Bandi &
Casiraghi 2011). Chimeras and Consciousness can be
certainly read along such inspirational line. Although
affected by a certain lack of scientific focus and coher-
ence, and perhaps not the best form to that aim (would
a suggestive, single-authored monograph do the job bet-
ter?), Chimeras and Consciousness is a new concretion
of the illustrious tradition coming from ancient hylozoist
thinkers through Leibniz, a tradition struggling with fi-
nalistic thinking and challenging mechanism, seen as
drifting and - today more than yesterday - hazardous for
our future.
Endnotes
a As Schaechter (2012) summarized, ‘evolution [. . .] al-
so occurs by the acquisition of packets of genes simul-
taneously[. . .] by acquiring an combining multiple arrays
of genes that evolved for different functions [. . .] bac-
teria acquire such packets through the incorporation of
viruses or plasmids’.
b Cantico di Frate Sole (also known as Canticus or
Laudes Creaturarum or Cantico delle Creature) is the
most ancient text in Italian literature. It is both a hymn
contrasting the demarcation and isolation of the self and
a praise about brotherhood going beyond the human
species to embrace the whole universe. Particular atten-
tion is given to Earth, felt in relation with the Sun and
the Moon. Authors see community between Saint
Francis of Assisi and Lovelock by virtue of love for our
planet considered as a living being. They interpret the
Saint’s thanksgiving as the awareness of our dependency
from all creatures and of the deep connectedness of
identities.
c Chapter 8: Nested communities.
d Chapter 9: Cosmic rhythms of life.
e Chapter 10: Life’s tectonics.
f Chapter 13: From movement to sensation.
g Chapter 17: Origins of the immune system.
h Chapter 18: Medical symbiotics.
i Chapter 14: Packaging DNA.
j Chapter 15: Lemurs and split chromosomes.
k Chapter 16: Interspecies hybrids.
l On the serious lack of scientific consensus of the
larval-transfer hypothesis see ‘Unification as a putative
causal story’.
m Chapter 20: Brains and symbols.
n Chapter 21: Thermodynamics and thought.
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live”.
p Chapter 23: Cultural networks.
q According to an insightful expression by Schaechter
(2012), Lynn Margulis was an example of ‘science by
erudition’.
r Cf. essay 11.
s Seen from the point of view of Gaia theory, for ex-
ample, life’s sensitivity to the quantity and saltiness of
water may be the most elemental of all senses (cf. Intro-
duction, p. 12).
t Set aside, for now, the fact that a quick identification
of Saint Francis’s family and the filament of heterocysts
leans towards the conflation between ontogeny and
phylogeny that we are going to analyze below.
u Another intelligence-related example, in essay 18, is
the statement that ‘The Internet is becoming a neural
net - a self-sensing, proprioceptive superorganismic or-
gan of cyber-intelligence. “Wiring” - the connecting up
of member of societies into superorganisms - has been
going on for thousands of millions of years, since before
the origin of eukaryotic cells’ (p. 213).
v ‘Sensitivity, awareness and consciousness correlate
with living behaviour, which evolutionarily began with
bacteria. . . Cell awareness was here from the time of the
origin of earliest life. Awareness and sensation continued
to evolve into full-blown consciousness as we humans
experience and verbalize it’ (p. 3).
w The same impression comes from Mann (1991)
when he recounts Margulis’s view that ‘the unit of bio-
logical study is not the individual but the symbiotic sys-
tem, which is primarily characterized by the property of
“autopoiesis”’ (p. 379).
x Empirical hypotheses can also be hypotheses about
absence: for example, no living beings exist in isolation
(2, 18).
y ‘Williamson has made a series of predictions arising
from his hypothesis and urged genomicists to test them.
Here, we use data already in the literature to show these
predictions to be false’ (Hart & Grosberg 2009).
z There are arguably several, more or less demanding
versions of the hypothesis. In the book, ‘Gaia is much
more an enormous set of nested communities that to-
gether form a single ecosystem than she is any single or-
ganism’ (p. 6); it ‘is a self-starting system with cybernetic
tendencies’ (p. 93); ‘Earth is an open thermodynamic
system that runs on an incessant input of energy form
the Sun. Energy flow across gradients generates organi-
zation and order’ (p. 93); ‘The biosphere is not equi-
valent to Gaia. The planetary Gaian system functions
as interrelated dynamic life processes’ (p. 99); ‘Gaia is
composed of nested communities with subsystems from
biomes to microbial associations’ (p. 100); ‘Reciprocity
is an emergent property of Gaia: life in and betweeninteractive communities shapes the Gaian system, and
natural selection shapes and limits the intrinsic tendency
of expansion of cells, individuals, communities and
ecosystems’ (p. 100); it ‘produces and removes gases,
ions, metals, and organic compounds through the
metabolism, growth, and reproduction of an estimated
30 million species [. . .]. These interactions in aequeous
solution lead to modulation of Earth’s surface
temperature, of acidity and alkalinity, and of the chem-
ically reactive gases of the atmosphere and the hydro-
sphere’ (p. 124). Gaia theory specifically proposes that
water regulation emerges from life itself (p. 11).
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